Contract theory studies the setting where a principal seeks to design a contract for rewarding an agent on the basis of the uncertain outcomes caused by the agent's private actions [

We consider a novel dynamic pricing and learning setting where in addition to setting prices of products in sequential rounds, the seller also ex-ante commits to'advertising schemes'. That is, in the beginning of each round the seller can decide what kind of signal they will provide to the buyer about the product's quality upon realization. Using the popular Bayesian persuasion framework to model the effect of these signals on the buyers' valuation and purchase responses, we formulate the problem of finding an optimal design of the advertising scheme along with a pricing scheme that maximizes the seller's expected revenue. Without any apriori knowledge of the buyers' demand function, our goal is to design an online algorithm that can use past purchase responses to adaptively learn the optimal pricing and advertising strategy. We study the regret of the algorithm when compared to the optimal clairvoyant price and advertising scheme.

To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods ( mechanism design) and by providing information ( information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect.

To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods ( mechanism design) and by providing information ( information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect.

We build a mechanism design framework where a platform designs GenAI models to screen users who obtain instrumental value from the generated conversation and privately differ in their preference for latency. We show that the revenue-optimal mechanism is simple: deploy a single aligned (user-optimal) model and use token cap as the only instrument to screen the user. The design decouples model training from pricing, is readily implemented with token metering, and mitigates misalignment pressures.

The problem of two-sided matching markets is well-studied in computer science and economics, owing to its diverse applications across numerous domains. Since market participants are usually uncertain about their preferences in various online matching platforms, an emerging line of research is dedicated to the online setting where one-side participants (players) learn their unknown preferences through multiple rounds of interactions with the other side (arms). Sankararaman et al. provide an $Ω\left( \frac{N\log(T)}{Δ^2} + \frac{K\log(T)}Δ \right)$ regret lower bound for this problem under serial dictatorship assumption, where $N$ is the number of players, $K (\geq N)$ is the number of arms, $Δ$ is the minimum reward gap across players and arms, and $T$ is the time horizon. Serial dictatorship assumes arms have the same preferences, which is common in reality when one side participants have a unified evaluation standard. Recently, the work of Kong and Li proposes the ET-GS algorithm and achieves an $O\left( \frac{K\log(T)}{Δ^2} \right)$ regret upper bound, which is the best upper bound attained so far. Nonetheless, a gap between the lower and upper bounds, ranging from $N$ to $K$, persists. It remains unclear whether the lower bound or the upper bound needs to be improved. In this paper, we propose a multi-level successive selection algorithm that obtains an $O\left( \frac{N\log(T)}{Δ^2} + \frac{K\log(T)}Δ \right)$ regret bound when the market satisfies serial dictatorship. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose an algorithm that matches the lower bound in the problem of matching markets with bandits.

In democracies, major policy decisions typically require some form of majority or consensus, so elites must secure mass support to govern. Historically, elites could shape support only through limited instruments like schooling and mass media; advances in AI-driven persuasion sharply reduce the cost and increase the precision of shaping public opinion, making the distribution of preferences itself an object of deliberate design. We develop a dynamic model in which elites choose how much to reshape the distribution of policy preferences, subject to persuasion costs and a majority rule constraint. With a single elite, any optimal intervention tends to push society toward more polarized opinion profiles - a ``polarization pull'' - and improvements in persuasion technology accelerate this drift. When two opposed elites alternate in power, the same technology also creates incentives to park society in ``semi-lock'' regions where opinions are more cohesive and harder for a rival to overturn, so advances in persuasion can either heighten or dampen polarization depending on the environment. Taken together, cheaper persuasion technologies recast polarization as a strategic instrument of governance rather than a purely emergent social byproduct, with important implications for democratic stability as AI capabilities advance.

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.

Current large language model (LLM) agents lack authentic human psychological processes necessary for genuine digital twins and social AI applications. To address this limitation, we present a computational implementation of Global Workspace Theory (GNWT) that integrates human cognitive architecture principles into LLM agents, creating specialized sub-agents for emotion, memory, social norms, planning, and goal-tracking coordinated through a global workspace mechanism. However, authentic digital twins require accurate personality initialization. We therefore develop a novel adventure-based personality test that evaluates true personality through behavioral choices within interactive scenarios, bypassing self-presentation bias found in traditional assessments. Building on these innovations, our CogniPair platform enables digital twins to engage in realistic simulated dating interactions and job interviews before real encounters, providing bidirectional cultural fit assessment for both romantic compatibility and workplace matching. Validation using 551 GNWT-Agents and Columbia University Speed Dating dataset demonstrates 72% correlation with human attraction patterns, 77.8% match prediction accuracy, and 74% agreement in human validation studies. This work advances psychological authenticity in LLM agents and establishes a foundation for intelligent dating platforms and HR technology solutions.

We study the behavior of for-profit institutions that broadcast reputations to foster trust among market participants. We develop a theoretical model in which buyers and sellers are matched on a platform to engage in transactions involving a moral hazard: sellers can either faithfully deliver goods after receiving payment, or not. Although the buyer does not know a seller's true type, the platform maintains a reputation system that probabilistically assigns binary reputation signals. Buyers make purchase decisions based on reputation signals, which influence the payoffs to sellers who then adapt their type over time. These market dynamics ultimately shape the platform's profit from commissions on sales. Our analysis reveals that platforms inherently have an incentive for rating inflation, driven by the desire to increase commission. This introduces a second layer of moral hazard: the platform's incentive to distort reputations for its own profit. Such distortion is self-limited by the platform's need to maintain enough accuracy that trustworthy sellers remain in the market, without which rational buyers would refrain from purchases altogether. Nonetheless, the optimal strategy for the platform can be to invest in order to reduce signal accuracy. When the platform can freely set commission fees, however, maximum profit may be achieved by costly investment in an accurate reputation system. These findings highlight the intricate tensions between platform incentives and resulting social utility for marketplace participants.